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Summary 
Do intermediate goods help explain relative and aggregate productivity differences across 
countries? Three observations suggest they do: (i) intermediates are relatively expensive in 
poor countries; (ii) goods industries demand intermediates more intensively than service 
industries; (iii) goods industries are more prominent intermediate suppliers in poor 
countries. I build a standard multisector growth model accommodating these features to 
show that inefficient intermediate production strongly depresses aggregate productivity and 
increases the price ratio of final goods to services. Applying the model to data for middle 
and high income countries, I find that poorer countries are only modestly less efficient at 
producing goods than services, but substantially less efficient at producing intermediate 
relative to final goods and services. If all countries had the intermediate production 
efficiency of the US, the aggregate productivity gap between the lowest and highest income 
countries in the sample is predicted to shrink by roughly two thirds while cross-country 
differences in the final price ratio would virtually vanish.  
 
Keywords: Development Accounting, Productivity, Intermediate Goods 
 
JEL Classification: O10, O41, O47  
 
This paper was one of the three winners of the third edition of the FEEM Award (2011), a prize 
organized jointly with the European Economic Association (EEA), aimed at rewarding the best 
research by young economists.  
I would like to thank Juan Carlos Conesa, Tim Kehoe, Nezih Guner, Omar Licandro, Jordi Caballé, 
Fabrizio Perri, Franck Portier and Vasco Carvalho for many helpful comments. I would also like to 
thank participants at the XV Workshop on Dynamic Macroeconomics at Vigo, the 2011 ENTER 
Jamboree in Tilburg, the 2011 EEA conference in Oslo, the macro workshop at the UAB and the 
international trade workshop at the University of Minnesota. All errors are mine. 
 
 
Address for correspondence: 
           
          Jan Grobovšek 
          Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
Edifici B - Campus de la Autònoma 
08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona 
Spain 
E-mail: jankristijan.grobovsek@uab.cat DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
JAN GROBOVˇ SEK
Abstract. Do intermediate goods help explain relative and aggregate productivity dif-
ferences across countries? Three observations suggest they do: (i) intermediates are
relatively expensive in poor countries; (ii) goods industries demand intermediates more
intensively than service industries; (iii) goods industries are more prominent intermediate
suppliers in poor countries. I build a standard multisector growth model accommodating
these features to show that ineﬃcient intermediate production strongly depresses aggre-
gate productivity and increases the price ratio of ﬁnal goods to services. Applying the
model to data for middle and high income countries, I ﬁnd that poorer countries are only
modestly less eﬃcient at producing goods than services, but substantially less eﬃcient
at producing intermediate relative to ﬁnal goods and services. If all countries had the
intermediate production eﬃciency of the US, the aggregate productivity gap between
the lowest and highest income countries in the sample is predicted to shrink by roughly
two thirds while cross-country diﬀerences in the ﬁnal price ratio would virtually vanish.
1. Introduction
The value of intermediate production as a ratio of total output in a typical economy
is about one half. Despite their quantitative importance, intermediate goods have so far
received little attention in development accounting. This should per se not be of any
concern if the eﬃciency of intermediate relative to ﬁnal good production were not sys-
tematically diﬀerent across countries and if the structure of input-output relations were
not asymmetric across broadly-deﬁned industries. My concern in this paper is threefold.
First, I document that the above conditions for intermediate good-neutrality do not hold
up in the data. Second, I develop a simple growth model featuring two industries and two
specializations (intermediate and ﬁnal production) and propose some analytical qualita-
tive results based on a plausible input-output structure. Third, I use the model to back
out eﬃciency levels across countries to identify which industry-specializations pairs are
particularly ineﬃcient in poor countries.
Two observations are key for the paper’s motivation. First, diﬀerent broadly-deﬁned
sectors have systematically distinct technological requirements as regards the use of in-
termediates and vary systematically in their importance as suppliers of intermediates.
More to the point, when the economy is subdivided into goods and service industries,
the former consume more intermediate value per unit of output, approximately 0.57 ver-
sus 0.36. Goods industries also supply a relatively larger share of intermediates in poor
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compared to rich countries. This issue has been, to the best of my knowledge, largely
overlooked in the recent literature on development accounting, but proves signiﬁcant in
interaction with another set of empirical regularities. This is the fact that for the same
industry, intermediate goods, relative to ﬁnal goods, appear to be relatively expensive in
poor countries. It motivates the additional dichotomy between ﬁrms specializing in either
ﬁnal or intermediate production.
The main theoretical results are the following. First, it is shown that the price of ﬁnal
goods relative to ﬁnal services is expected to be lower in less eﬃcient economies even if
their eﬃciency in the goods industry is no lower relative to the one in the service industry.
Rather, because the goods industry is a more intensive intermediate input user than
the service industry, low eﬃciency in all industry-specialization pairs renders the goods
industry relatively less productive than the service industry as intermediate resources
are relatively scarce compared to labor. Second, it is shown that if relative to poor
countries, rich countries were particularly more eﬃcient at producing intermediate goods
and services, then all specialization-industry pairs except for specialized intermediate
goods (as opposed to service) producers are likely to increase their real intensity use of
intermediates. This happens despite the fact that intensity is by construction identical
in value terms. Third, compared to percent increases in the eﬃciency of ﬁnal good
production, a percent increase in the eﬃciency of intermediate input production has a
relatively stronger impact on theoretical aggregate productivity in poor countries than in
rich countries. This is because poor countries not only have higher ﬁnal expenditure shares
on goods than services, they also spend larger fractions of intermediate consumption on
goods than on services. In turn, goods - in both specializations - are more sensitive to
increases in intermediate production eﬃciency than services. In other words, observed
complementarities in the production of intermediate goods strongly leverage ineﬃciencies
of intermediate input production.
For the quantitative part I employ the EU Klems dataset for a sample of middle and
high income countries which features comparable intermediate and ﬁnal prices and quan-
tities. The results suggest that compared to rich countries, poor countries are less eﬃcient
across the board in all industry-specialization pairs. More interestingly, poorer countries
are only modestly less eﬃcient at producing (ﬁnal or intermediate) goods than services.
Moreover, poorer countries are particularly less eﬃcient at producing intermediate rather
than ﬁnal goods and services. The fact that ﬁnal goods are relatively more expensive in
poor countries than ﬁnal services hence does not result so much from the fact that these
countries are particularly worse at producing goods compared to services. Rather, it is
due to the fact that poor countries are relatively ineﬃcient at producing intermediates.
The model oﬀers a straightforward method to gauge the separate eﬀects created by
the input-output structure and by eﬃciency diﬀerences across specializations. I ﬁnd
that ignoring the fact that intermediate and ﬁnal good production is done at diﬀerent
eﬃciency levels substantially increases the perceived eﬃciency gap that poor countries
have in producing goods rather than services. Also, poor countries in this context appear
much less eﬃcient at producing both ﬁnal goods and services than in the benchmark
case. In a similar fashion, ignoring the intermediate input demand asymmetry between
goods and services also strongly exaggerates the poor countries’ eﬃciency gap between the
production of goods and services. Ignoring the supply asymmetry creates an analogous
eﬀect, though it is quantitatively less important. A development accounting exercise
ignoring these features is therefore likely to underestimate poor countries’ eﬃciency in
producing ﬁnal goods and services and is furthermore likely to exaggerate especially their
ineﬃciency in creating goods vis-` a-vis services.DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS 3
As i m p l ec o u n t e r f a c t u a le x e r c i s es t r e s s e st h ei m p a c to fi n t e r m e d i a t ei n p u t si nt h ea c -
counting framework. If middle income countries were somehow able to adopt the US
eﬃciency of intermediate good production, their aggregate productivity (compared to the
richest countries) is predicted to increase from about 0.47% to 0.84%. Also, such a move
would almost equalize the ﬁnal good price ratios across poor and high income countries.
This ﬁnding is important. It states that the eﬃciency of intermediate good production
is responsible for the bulk of the aggregate and relative productivity diﬀerences across
countries.
The paper is closely related to the literature on sectoral development accounting. Based
on ﬁnal expenditure price data, Herrendorf and Valentinyi (forthcoming) compute that
poor countries are particularly bad at producing goods as compared to services. On the
other hand, Duarte and Restuccia (2010) present evidence, based on industry growth
accounting and the pattern of structural transformation, that poorer countries are par-
ticularly unproductive in the agriculture and services sectors, but not so much in manu-
facturing. My aim is to shed light on these conﬂicting pieces of evidence by stressing the
importance of input-output patterns in determining relative sectoral productivities. Ngai
and Samaniego (2009) similarly stress the importance of the composition of intermediate
goods for productivity inferences, though their focus is on investment-speciﬁc technical
change.
1
The literature oﬀers some support for the notion that the production of intermediate
goods is particularly ineﬃcient in poor countries. On the theoretical front, Acemoglu,
Antr` as and Helpman (2007) apply the incomplete contracts framework of Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) to the analysis of contracts between producers and
their specialized input suppliers. They ﬁnd that a higher degree of contract incompleteness
lowers the suppliers’ incentive to invest and hence leads to underprovision of intermediate
inputs. This ﬁts well with empirical evidence provided by Nunn (2008) who argues that
countries with more eﬃcient contractual institutions tend to be richer and specialize in
the production of goods that require special relationships with suppliers. An alternative
reason for poor countries’ low performance in producing intermediates is a lower degree
of competitive pressure. Amiti and Konings (2007) provide empirical support that the
lowering of trade barriers in developing countries boosts productivity by increasing import
competition in the market for intermediate goods. That foreign competitive pressures
strongly boost productivity in a prominent intermediate good producing sector such as
mining is also empirically documented in Gald´ on-S´ anchez and Schmitz (2002).
As intermediates are essential factors of production, a strand of the literature has
focused on their underprovision as a substantial barrier to development. Jones (forth-
coming) shows theoretically how generic wedges that disperse the marginal productivity
of intermediate goods, coupled with these goods’ complementarity in production, leads to
substantial leverage eﬀects on productivity.
2 His model builds on the seminal contribution
of Mirrlees (1971) on the negative welfare eﬀect of taxing intermediate inputs and the one
of Kremer (1993) on the problem of complementarity in production. Ciccone (2002) is
also a theoretical treatment of the process of industrialization as the deepening of inter-
mediate good use intensity, based on some evidence to that eﬀect reported in Chenery,
Robinson and Syrquin (1986). Restuccia, Yan and Zhu (2008), based on producer price
data of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ﬁnd that farms in poor countries
1The classical theoretical contributions on growth accounting with intermediate goods include amongst
others Melvin (1969) and Hulten (1978).
2The dispersion of productivities within sectors as a source of large aggregate productivity diﬀerences
has recently received a lot of attention as well. See for instance Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005), Guner,
Ventura and Yi (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).4 DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
face substantially higher relative prices for intermediate goods. This lowers their agri-
cultural productivity, which in turn strongly diminishes aggregate productivity as due
to the negative income eﬀect most resources are channeled into agriculture. Finally, the
interest in (real) physical intermediate input intensity as opposed to value intensity is
very similar in spirit to Hsieh and Klenow (2007). They stress that poorer countries have
lower investment rates in physical capital when measured at internationally comparable
prices, but not at local prices. Here I highlight a similar phenomenon by claiming that
ap o r t i o no fp o o rc o u n t r i e s ’l o wp r o d u c t i v i t yc a nb e‘ e x p l a i n e d ’b yt h e i rl o wi n v e s t m e n t
rates in the production factor intermediate goods.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the empirical evidence.
Section 2 proposes the model environment. The theoretical results of the model are
summarized in section 3 while section 4 explores the data implications following the
calibration of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical motivation
2.1. Relative prices
One of the most salient stylized features in development accounting is that at the level
of ﬁnal expenditure, goods (agricultural, industrial consumption and investment goods)
are relatively more expensive than services in poorer countries. Figure (1)r e p r o d u c e st h e
data to that eﬀect from the World Bank’s International Comparisons Program.
3 These
relative price diﬀerences are presumably informative about which are the ‘problem sec-
tors’ in poor countries if one is interested in growth accounting at the ﬁnal expenditure
level. Herrendorf and Valentinyi (forthcoming) use similar data to construct production
functions for diﬀerent sectors to back out sectoral TFP series. They ﬁnd that the poorest
countries are particularly ineﬃcient at producing agricultural and investment goods, and
also ineﬃcient at producing consumption goods, while much less ineﬃcient at producing
services.
The trouble with such an approach is that it does not directly imply relative productiv-
ity diﬀerences at the industry level. This information, however, would be more valuable
for researchers trying to micro-found productivity diﬀerences across countries and sectors
that is related to ineﬃciencies at the level of the production unit. To circumvent this
problem, Duarte and Restuccia (2009) use a structural transformation model to measure
cross-country sectoral productivity diﬀerences for OECD countries and a smaller sample
of middle income countries. They infer level diﬀerences from relative employment shares
at a given moment in time and then use industry-based productivity growth data to
measure productivity growth and hence productivity levels through time. Interestingly,
and in stark contrast, they ﬁnd that rich compared to poor countries have much higher
productivity levels in the production of agricultural goods and services but not so much
in manufacturing.
The diﬀerence in the two results may of course only be due to the fact that Herren-
dorf and Valentinyi (forthcoming) measure TFP while Duarte and Restuccia (2010) infer
productivity, but since the sectoral physical and human capital factor shares used by
Herrendorf and Valentinyi (forthcoming) do not vary much between manufacturing and
services, this seems unlikely. Rather, the conﬂicting evidence calls for an analysis that
explicitly takes into account the input-output pattern in the economy in determining the
relative sectoral productivity levels. Such an analysis could explain why in poor coun-
tries sectors producing goods appear to be relatively less productive than service sectors
3The construction of all the series in the following Figures is described in the Appendix.DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS 5
Figure 1. Relative price of expenditure items
Figure 2. Relative cost of intermediate to ﬁnal goods
measured at ﬁnal expenditure level, while the result is partially reversed at the industry
level.
One indicator that intermediate goods play an essential role in development accounting
is the fact that they appear to be relatively expensive in poor countries. This observation6 DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
comes out of the only dataset on internationally comparable relative prices at the industry
level, provided by EU Klems and covering most OECD countries and several Central and
Eastern European countries (for further discussion see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009)).
Figure (2)p l o t sd a t af o re a c hs a m p l ec o u n t r yo nt h ep r i c eo fi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s( s e r v i c e s )
relative to the price of ﬁnal goods (services) against data on aggregate hourly productiv-
ity. The downward-sloping shape of the series suggests that in both industries - goods
and services - intermediates are particularly expensive compared to ﬁnal goods in poor
countries.
2.2. Intermediate consumption and supply shares
Figure (3) summarizes the intermediate consumption factors (value of an industry’s
intermediate good consumption needed for one unit of output value - the diﬀerence to
one is the industry’s value-added) across countries from internationally comparable input-
output tables (for further details see Ahmad and Yamano (2006)). Each dot represents
the ratio of country-year pairs for broadly deﬁned industries, plotted against the country’s
GDP per capita in that year.
4
Figure 3. Intermediate factor shares
Two apparent trends stand out. First, for both sectors the ratios seem rather uncorre-
lated with GDP per capita. This fact has been previously pointed out elsewhere for the
overall intermediate consumption ratio in the economy (e.g. Jones (forthcoming)). It runs
counter, however, to the argument expressed in Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986),
according to which input-output ratios may have increased during industrialization in
several developing countries, possibly due to the adoption of diﬀerent technological prac-
tices.
5 In this paper I will abstract from arguments involving changes in technology and
4The sample includes OECD as well as several non-OECD countries. GDP per capita values are taken
from the Penn World Tables. The years are 1995, 2000 and 2005.
5This study is related to the analysis of the economy by means of the Leontieﬀ matrix and has its roots
in the identiﬁcation of optimal demand stimulus. In particular, the concern there is with the ‘technicalDEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS 7
treat the input-output ratio of an industry as depending exclusively on a time-invariant
factor share of inputs in the production function. Rather, I wish to highlight the other
feature that emerges from Figure (3), namely that industries vary substantially in their
requirement of intermediate goods. In particular, the ﬁgure shows that the production
of goods uses up relatively larger values of intermediate goods than the production of
services. I claim that this is an aspect that may not have received suﬃcient attention in
the latest literature on aggregate productivity across countries.
Figure 4. Shares of intermediates from same own industry
The constancy of aggregate intermediate factor shares across countries and industries
does not, however, extend to a ﬁner breakdown of intermediate goods by types. Figure
(4)s h o w st h a ta sc o u n t r i e sg r o wr i c h e r ,i n d u s t r i e sp r o d u c i n gg o o d st e n dt ou s er a t h e rl e s s
intermediates deriving from their own sector, as a share of their total intermediate good
consumption, while service industries tend to use rather more intermediates deriving from




Ic o n s i d e rac l o s e de c o n o m yt h a ti ss t a t i cs ot h eﬁ r m s ’a n dh o u s e h o l d s ’o b j e c t i v e so n l y
need to be speciﬁed over intratemporal choices.
3.1.1. Production
All ﬁrms operate in a competitive environment. They specialize in producing either
ﬁnal or intermediate goods, indexed respectively by j ∈{ f,m}. At the ﬁnal good level
coeﬃcients’, i.e. the multiplier value of demand in upstream sectors due to a percentage increase in a
ﬁnal demand sector.8 DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
there is a representative ﬁrm indexed by i ∈{ g,s} in each of the two industries - goods






















where yfi,a n dlfi denote, respectively, ﬁrm fi’s output and labor input while xjfi is
the ﬁrm’s demand for the intermediate good supplied by industry j. Afi > 0i st h e
ﬁrm’s eﬃciency parameter, σi ∈ (0,1) the composite intermediate good factor share,
ρi ∈ [0,1) ∪ (1,∞)t h ee l a s t i c i t yo fs u b s t i t u t i o nb e t w e e nt h et w oi n t e r m e d i a t ei n p u t s
and γgi ∈ (0,1) their relative weights in production, with
￿
j=s,g γji =1 . T h eﬁ r m ’ s
maximization of proﬁts implies
max
xgfi≥0,xsfi≥0,lfi≥0
(pfiyfi− pmgxgfi − pmsxsfi − wlfi)( 2 )
where pfi is the price of the ﬁrm’s output, pmj the price of intermediate input j and w
the wage rate.






















with Ami > 0, and solve
max
xgmi≥0,xsmi≥0,lmi≥0
(pmiymi − pmgxgmi − pmsxsmi − wlmi). (4)
Notice that the technical parameters σ, ρ and γ are assumed to vary across industries,
but not across specializations or across countries. In contrast, eﬃciency A is speciﬁc to
both industry and specialization and is thought of as the only variable that varies across
countries. Also, note that specialized intermediate good producers use part of their output
as an input. Market clearing implies that
ci = yfi,i ∈{ g,s}, (5)
xifg + xifs + ximg + xims = ymi,i ∈{ g,s}. (6)
where ci is consumption of ﬁnal good i.
At this point several clariﬁcations are necessary. First, note that the distinction be-
tween two industry is not only related to convenience and access to data. As argued
in the previous section, there are grounds to believe that along the dimensions of in-
terest here - intermediate goods trade and relative productivity - there is a clear-cut
distinction between industries producing goods and those producing services. A further
breakdown of the goods industry into consumption and investment goods would enrich
the model by incorporating investment behavior. Similarly, a breakdown into agriculture
and manufacturing would allow the model to capture better the phenomenon of structural
transformation. Yet both would come at the price of less analytical tractability of the
central issue here.7
Second, the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation between composite intermediate inputs and
labor can be defended empirically by the argument of stable intermediate factor shares
6Goods will have as their empircial counterpart the industry labels A-F while services industries G-Q.
7This also allows to compare results with the literature that explicitly microfounds relative sectoral
eﬃciency diﬀerences across countries and which is usually framed within two sectors. One example is
Buera, Kaboski and Shin (forthcoming) who show a theoretically how in poorer countries the eﬃciency
of tradables suﬀers more from ﬁnancial frictions than the one of non-tradables.DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS 9
across countries as presented in Figure (3). The relative mix of industry-speciﬁc inter-
mediate goods, however, is allowed to vary systematically with relative price changes,
consistent with the discussed evidence in Figure (4).
Third, given the form of the production function (1)a n d( 3)Ii n t e r p r e tA as factor-
neutral eﬃciency. In this I follow Jones (2009) or the multifactor analysis in the EU
Klems data, which implicitly assumes that eﬃciency is embedded in intermediate goods




















1−σ where eﬃciency B = A1−σ is purely embedded in
labor.8 Independently of the speciﬁcation, however, A is thought of as capturing both
actual (technical and organizational) eﬃciency as well as the use of additional production
factors such as physical and human capital that are not explicitly modeled here.
3.1.2. Households
Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eh o u s e h o l ds o l v e st h ep r o b l e m
max
cg≥0,cs≥0




















pfgcg + pfscs ≤ w(lfg + lfs+ lmg + lms)( 8 )
and
lfg + lfs+ lmg + lms =1 , (9)
where ρ ∈ [0,1) ∪ (1,∞) denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two ﬁnal
consumption goods and ω ∈ (0,1) their relative weights in production, with
￿
i=s,g ωi =1 .
The utility function is similar to the one in Ngai and Pissarides (2007), implying that
observed secular changes in the expenditure composition between ﬁnal goods are driven
by relative price changes, the so-called Baumol disease.9 As e c o n dt h i n gt on o t ei st h a t
calling c a consumption good is a slight abuse of language. What is meant by c is actually
more the ﬁnal use of the good, i.e. it can be used for investment as well as consumption.
Also, in view of the subsequent data analysis, note that in an open economy context c
could equally represent an export (whether in the form of a ﬁnal or an intermediate good
- the crucial point is that it is not consumed as an intermediate in the home economy).
3.2. Equilibrium deﬁnition
The equilibrium is a list of production, {yji}j∈{f,m},i∈{s,g},ﬁ n a lc o n s u m p t i o nd e m a n d
{cj}j∈{f,m},i n t e r m e d i a t eg o o dd e m a n d{xnji}j∈{f,m},i,n∈{s,g},l a b o ra l l o c a t i o n s{lji}j∈{f,m},i∈{s,g},
prices {pji}j∈{f,m},i∈{s,g},a n dt h ew a g er a t ew such that:
i) households take {pfi}i∈{s,g} and w as given and solve (7)s u b j e c tt o( 8)a n d( 9);
8Moro (2007) is one exception in the literature to use the alternative speciﬁcation by which technology
is not embedded in intermediate goods.
9Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (2009) analyze the relative merits of this speciﬁcation compared
to one based on income eﬀects (as for instance in Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001)) in accounting for
secular changes in expenditure shares in the US. They ﬁnd that it matches the data better when each
consumption item is a composite of the value-added provided by its industry, while income eﬀects are
important when items are identiﬁed according to the ﬁnal product classiﬁcation, as I do in this paper.
I nonetheless choose the above utility speciﬁcation because all relevant datasets point to strong relative
price diﬀerences across countries at diﬀerent stages of development, something that Herrendorf, Rogerson
and Valentinyi (2009) cannot identify from the historical US ﬁnal product data. In any case, most of
the ensuing theoretical results and empirical inferences about eﬃciency parameters do not depend on the
utility speciﬁcation (only international GDP comparisons do).10 DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
ii) the representative ﬁnal good producer in industry i ∈{ g,s} takes input prices
{pmi}i∈{s,g}, w and output price pfi as given and solves (2);
iii) the representative intermediate good producer in industry i ∈{ g,s} takes prices
{pmi}i∈{s,g} and w as given and solves (4);
iv) the goods markets clear so that (1), (3), (5)a n d( 6)a r es a t i s ﬁ e d∀i ∈{ g,s};
4. Theoretical implications
Assuming an interior solution, the equilibrium leads to a straightforward characteriza-
tion, which is described in detail in the Appendix. This subsection identiﬁes the quali-
tative theoretical general equilibrium eﬀect of movements in the eﬃciency parameters A
on prices, intermediate input intensity and aggregate productivity. For this I consider a
setup where eﬃciency levels A in all countries (or alternatively a rich benchmark country)
are ﬁxed while the ones in a relatively poor country of interest experience simultaneous
positive changes, which is to say that the country converges in income. I will consider
two possible scenarios, deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. Industry-neutral growth: Percent changes in eﬃciency across in-












Deﬁnition 2. Specialization-neutral growth: Percent changes in eﬃciency across




















,∀i ∈{ s,g}. (10)
Since production functions across specializations are identically parameterized, the price
ratios between ﬁnal and intermediate good suppliers in each industry is fully characterized
by their relative eﬃciency. Note that the downward sloping price ratios across special-
izations in Figure (2)s u g g e s tt h a tp o o r e rc o u n t r i e sa r er e l a t i v e l yw o r s ea tp r o d u c i n g
intermediate goods in both industries. The ﬁnal good price ratio pfs/pfg is implicitly
















































Because the two industries are cross-linked through trade in intermediate goods, the latter
is independent of the speciﬁcation of the utility function and only reﬂects underlying
technological parameters. Combining (1)w i t h( 21)a n d( 22) from the Appendix obtains
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Comparing relative ﬁnal prices across rich (R)a n dp o o r( P)c o u n t r i e st h e r e f o r eg i v e sa



















This is not to say, however, that this price ratio is also a relevant measure of relative
eﬃciencies across industries, as formalized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume the economy becomes more eﬃcient across the board in the sense
that dAfg, dAfs, dAmg, dAms > 0. (i) Under industry-neutral technical change the relative
price of ﬁnal services to ﬁnal goods pfs/pfg is increasing (decreasing) if and only if σg >
(<) σs; (ii) under specialization-neutral technical change pfs/pfg is increasing (decreasing)






The data presented in the previous section (Figure 3)i n d i c a t e st h a tg o o d si n d u s t r i e s
have higher intermediate factor shares than services (σg >σ s). The stylized fact that the
relative value of pfs/pfg increases as a country catches up in development hence does not
imply that convergence is necessarily accompanied by higher growth in the goods industry
compared to services. Because goods production (versus services) is more sensitive to the
cost of intermediates, (industry-neutral) increases in eﬃciency are likely to magnify the
productivity of the goods industry more than the one of the services industry.10 It need
not be therefore that poor countries are particularly ineﬃcient at producing goods. The
second part of Proposition 1 states that converging countries could indeed have faster
growth in services compared to goods and still experience an increase in the ratio pfs/pfg.
One implication of this is that even if rich countries were actually relatively better at
producing services than goods (as may well have resulted from the analysis in Duarte
and Restuccia (2010) if they had treated agriculture and manufacturing as one industry),
goods may still turn out to be relatively cheaper in these countries due to the demand side
of the input-output relationship. Not taking this relationship into account by focusing
only on ﬁnal goods can lead to a biased diagnostic on which industries are the ‘problem
sectors’ of poor countries.
4.2. Intermediate good intensity
Ac o m m o nm e a s u r eo fi n t e r e s ti nd e v e l o p m e n ta c c o u n t i n gi st h ec a p i t a lt oo u t p u tr a t i o .
In a similar vein it is of interest to identify industry and specialization-speciﬁc intermediate
good to output ratios. For this I deﬁne the composite intermediate input m demanded


















and by ￿ pji its associated
price so that ￿ pjimji = pmgxgji + pmsxsji.F r o m t h e C o b b - D o u g l a s s p e c i ﬁ c a t i o n o f t h e







= σi, ∀j ∈{ f,m},i∈{ s,g}. (13)
By construction the intermediate consumption ratios in the two industries in value terms
are constant across countries, which mimics the evidence in Figure (3). What does vary
in value is the relative composition of the composite intermediate good. The combination
10This is analogous to international trade theories in the tradition of Hekscher and Ohlin where poor
countries are thought of as being relatively unproductive in producing goods with high capital intensity,
where capital endowments are ﬁxed. Here intermediate inputs are not ﬁxed, but their supply is relatively
less abundant than labor in poor countries because their aggregate production is lower.12 DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
of (10)w i t h( 21)a n d( 22)o b t a i n st h er e l a t i v es h a r eo ft h ei n d u s t r i e s ’i n t e r m e d i a t e st h a t









￿1−ρg , ∀j ∈{ f,m} (14)










￿ρs−1, ∀j ∈{ f,m} (15)
≡ Γss ∈ (0,1).
The real intensity in the composite intermediate good, however, is expected to vary
across countries depending on the relative values of A as summarized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume the economy becomes more eﬃcient across the board in the sense
that dAfg, dAfs, dAmg, dAms > 0. (i) Under industry-neutral technical change the real
intermediate input intensity mmg/ymg is decreasing (increasing) if and only if σg > (<)
σs, mms/yms is increasing (decreasing) if and only if σg > (<) σs, mfg/yfg is increasing




dAf/Af > (<)1 , and




dAf/Af > (<)1 ; (ii) under specialization-neutral technical change mfg/yfg and mmg/ymg





dAg/Ag > (<)1 .
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Under industry-neutral technical change, for σg >σ s it is expected that as a countries
converges in income, the use of intermediates becomes less intensive in industries produc-
ing intermediate goods and more intensive in industries producing intermediate services.
The intuition for this result is that following Proposition 1, for σg >σ s,i n d u s t r y - n e u t r a l
technical change implies a fall in the relative price of ﬁnal goods. By (10), this also implies
a fall in the relative price of intermediate goods relative to services, pmg/pms.S i n c et h e
composite intermediate good is a combination of goods and services, it becomes relatively
more expensive for the intermediate goods industry and relatively less expensive for the
intermediate service industry. The sign of the change is unclear for ﬁnal goods producers.
Notice however that for dAm/Am >d A f/Af (which is also consistent with the data), the
model suggests that at least the production of ﬁnal services, if not of ﬁnal goods as well, is
likely to become more intensive in intermediate use as the economy converges. This latter
point suggests that for dAm/Am suﬃciently larger than dAf/Af all specialization-industry
pairs but one are expected to use intermediate inputs more intensively in real terms. This
is reminiscent of Hsieh and Klenow (2007) who show how richer countries use investment
goods more intensively because they are more eﬃcient at producing them.
4.3. Aggregate productivity
Value-added in each specialized industry jiis deﬁned as VA ji ≡ pjiyji−pmgxgji−pmsxsji.
Plugging the values for x from (21)a n d( 22)i n t ot h ee x p r e s s i o nf o r( 1)r e s u l t si nVA ji =
(1 − σi)pjiyji. Nominal GDP (per unit of labor) is deﬁned as GDP ≡
￿
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(1)a f t e rp l u g g i n gi n( 21)a n d( 22)o b t a i n st h ei n d i r e c tu t i l i t yf u n c t i o n ,a n dh e n c et h e




























































The diﬀerentiation of any of these expressions allows to analyze the relative impact of
changes in eﬃciency levels on aggregate productivity. In particular, it is of interest to
note which changes have more of an impact in poor versus rich countries.
Proposition 3. Assume the economy becomes more eﬃcient across the board in the sense
that dAfg, dAfs, dAmg, dAms > 0. (i) Under industry-neutral technical change a percent
increase in intermediate good production eﬃciency Am increases real theoretical GDP
by a factor of
σg(1−σs)(1−Ωs)+σs(1−σg)Ωs+σgσs(2−Γgg−Γss)
(1−σg)(1−σs)+σg(1−σs)(1−Γgg)+σs(1−σg)(1−Γss) of a percent increase in ﬁnal good












￿1−ρ ∈ (0,1); (ii) under
specialization-neutral technical change a percent increase in goods production eﬃciency
Ag increases real theoretical GDP by a factor of
(1−σs)(1−Ωs)+σs(1−Γss)
(1−σg)Ωs+σg(1−Γgg) of a percent increase
in services production eﬃciency As.
Proof. Appendix. ￿
Structural transformation implies that the expenditure share of services Ωs is increas-
ing with rising income levels. Also, the evidence in Figure (...) suggests that in poorer
countries a larger fraction of intermediate inputs used by the goods industry derives
from its own sector (relatively large Γgg) while the opposite is true for the service in-
dustry (relatively low Γss). As mentioned, it will be shown that industry-neutral tech-
nical change is a reasonable description of the data. The numerator in the expression
of the ﬁrst point in Proposition 3 suggests that poorer countries are then expected to
beneﬁt more from changes in intermediate good production eﬃciency (relative to ﬁ-
nal good production eﬃciency) than rich countries because they have a rather high
value of σg (1 − σs)(1− Ωs)+σs (1 − σg)Ω s (while the value of 2 − Γgg − Γss is qual-
itatively indeterminate). As goods industries are more intensive in intermediate inputs
(σg (1 − σs) >σ s (1 − σg)), poor countries stand more to gain from higher eﬃciency
in intermediate production as they spend a larger fraction of income on goods. The
denominator of that expression strengthens this point because by the same argument
σg (1 − σs)(1− Γgg)+σs (1 − σg)(1− Γss)i sl i k e l yt ob el o w e ri np o o rc o u n t r i e s . T h i s
reﬂects the fact that poor countries use a higher fraction of goods in intermediate con-
sumption while goods are more sensitive to changes in the availability of intermediates
as explained in Proposition 1. Taken together, if industry-neutral technical change is a
good feature of the data, there is reason to believe that poor countries are more sensitive14 DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
to changes in the eﬃciency with which intermediates are produced. Put otherwise, ineﬃ-
ciencies in the production of intermediate goods are likely to strongly decrease the GDP
of poor countries due to complementarities in technology and preferences.
Specialization-neutral technical change will be shown to be less good of a data descrip-
tion. Note, however, from the expression in the second point in Proposition 3 the eﬀect
created by the supply side of the input-output table. If poor countries spend a larger
fraction of ﬁnal income on goods, it is natural that changes in the eﬃciency of producing
goods have, ceteris paribus, a relatively stronger eﬀect (vis-` a-vis improvements in produc-
ing services) than in rich countries, i.e.
(1−σs)(1−Ωs)
(1−σg)Ωs is relatively large in poor countries.
The supply side of the input-output table exacerbates this eﬀect (
σs(1−Γss)
σg(1−Γgg) is also likely
to be larger in poor countries) since poor countries spend a larger fraction on goods in
intermediate consumption as well.
5. Accounting and counterfactuals
In this section I infer the county-speciﬁc implied eﬃciencies A for the sample of coun-
tries included in the EU Klems 1997 benchmark study of cross-country price levels and
quantities at the industry level. I use this dataset because it is the only one to my knowl-
edge that provides comprehensive information on the relative cost of intermediate goods
across countries.11 Since the construction of the model and the discussion of the theoret-
ical results so far involved arguments based on Figures (1)-(4)t h a td e r i v ef r o md i ﬀ e r e n t
(and broader) data sources it is in order to check that the EU Klems data have the same
stylized features as the ones discusses above.
5.1. Calibration
5.1.1. Procedure
The method to construct the relevant data series is described in the Appendix. The
calibration of the model proceeds in three steps. First, using ﬁrst order conditions, I pin
down the technology-related parameters σg and σs directly and infer γgg and ρg as well
as γss and ρs from minimizing the discrepancy between the data and model predictions
across all countries in the sample. In the second step I back out the parameters Afg,
Afs, Amg and Ams for all countries from ﬁrst order conditions. Third, to close the model
Ii n f e rt h ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r sρ and ω from minimizing the discrepancy between the
data and model predictions.
Matching the condition (13)f o rb o t hs e c t o r sw i t ht h ed a t ao ni n t e r m e d i a t eg o o ds h a r e s
for all sample countries I compute average values of σg =0 .570 and σs =0 .357. Using
γgg + γsg =1a n dγgs + γss =1 ,t h ec o n d i t i o n s( 14)a n d( 15)c a nb er e w r i t t e nt og i v e
log
￿
pmg (xgfg + xgmg)


















pms (xsfs + xsms)











for each country k ∈{ 1,2,...,K} where εgk and εsk are assumed to be white noise. Using
EU Klems data on the observables on the left and right hand side the two separate OLS
regression across all countries deliver γgg =0 .677 and ρg =0 .178 as well as γss =0 .572 and
11The EU Klems dataset provides two series of prices, output prices and input prices. As described in
the Appendix, from this it is possible to construct separate series for intermediate and ﬁnal good prices.DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS 15
ρs =0 .223. Since both elasticities are less than unity, intermediate goods and intermediate
services are gross complements in the composite intermediate input of both industries.
With the parameter values in hand there is suﬃcient information to infer the four
eﬃciency values A for each country. The most straightforward way to do this would be
to use the productivity data for each specialized industry, yji/lji.I tc a nb ec h e c k e dt h a t
























































Ic a nc o n s t r u c td a t ao nyji,b u tb e c a u s et h ed a t a s e tu s e do n l yp r o v i d e si n f o r m a t i o no n
total hours worked by industry but not by specialization, I need to use supplementary
optimality conditions from the model for the purpose of identiﬁcation. In addition to the
above four equations I use (10)f o rb o t hi n d u s t r i e sa sw e l la slfg+lmg = lg and lfs+lms = ls.
Since pfs/pfg is then implicitly deﬁned in the model from (11)t h es o l u t i o ni si d e n t i ﬁ e d .
Note, however, that as data on pfs/pfg is readily available, it appears more judicious to
use it, and ex post check whether the model’s implied ﬁnal price ratio actually matches
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Table 1: Benchmark calibration
Finally, I need to pin down the utility parameters for the purpose of performing coun-
















where εpk is assumed to be white noise. I construct the left-hand side of the equation
using data on
pfgcg
pfscs and perform an OLS regression to obtain values ωg and ρ that best
match the household’s ﬁrst order condition with the data. These are 0.437 and 0.749,
so households have stronger preference for services, and less than unitary substitutability16 DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
between the two goods, the latter being consistent with structural transformation as a
result of faster productivity growth in the goods industry.
5.1.2. Model-data match
Figure (5)r e p o r t st h em o d e l ’ sd e v i a t i o nf r o mt h ed a t af o re a c hc o u n t r yi ns e v e r a l
variables of interest. A perfect match would be such that all the countries lie on the 45
degree line. The upper left panel compares the model’s measure of aggregate productivity
(which is just GDP/hour) with the data. It is natural that these two measures are not
identical because to measure productivity consistently across countries in the model, I
evaluate it at US prices, i.e. (GDP/l)
k
US price = ck
g +( pfs/pfg)
USck
s while the data are
based on international prices.12 This notwithstanding, there is no apparent bias in the
model’s predictions vis-` a-vis the data, suggesting that the model measure of aggregate
productivity can be employed for counterfactual exercises.
As explained above, even though the data price ratio pfs/pfg is used in the calibration,
it is not directly targeted. The model therefore predicts another price ratio, based on
relative productivities between the ﬁnal goods sectors. Again, it is apparent that the
model’s predictions do not depart widely from the data.
Figure 5. Model predictions versus data
What is of more concern is the amount of labor allocated to the goods sector lg.T h e
model clearly overestimates it. This is presumably because the preference parameters are
based on consumption shares, but the relation between consumption shares and labor
allocation in the data somewhat departs in the data. For the same reason, the model
also over-predicts value-added in the goods industry (lower left panel). These departures
should not be viewed with concern as regards the validity of the main result, which is the
12In the data, aggregate productivity across countries is evaluated in international prices. Using US
prices, however, is a good ﬁrst order approximation of international prices. This is because the country
weight used for the construction of international prices is nominal GDP and therefore the prices of large
and rich countries (especially the US) are disproportionately represented.DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS 17
measure of the countries’ eﬃciency levels, since the latter are not aﬀected by preferences.
The subsequent counterfactuals, however, must be regarded with some caution.
5.2. Results
Figure (6) presents the inferred eﬃciency levels. Each series is normalized so that
the US level equals 1 and is plotted against data on the countries’ aggregate hourly
productivity as given by the data. Several things stand out. First, and not surprisingly,
rich countries tend to be more eﬃcient in all specialization-industry pairs. Second, in both
specializations, the relationship between eﬃciency and aggregate productivity appears
to be rather similar for goods and services, with richer countries appearing to be only
slightly more eﬃcient at producing goods. The more pronounced diﬀerence is across
specializations: compared to poor countries, rich countries tend to be particularly more
eﬃcient at producing intermediate goods.
Figure 6. Implied eﬃciency levels
The ﬁrst column of Table (2) presents an alternative organization of these data. It
compares the mean eﬃciency for each category between the bottom and top quintile
sample countries in terms of aggregate productivity.13 Note that the eﬃciency gap between
the least and most productive countries in the production of ﬁnal goods is moderate, at
about 10-20%, and is only slightly larger for goods than services. The eﬃciency gap is
signiﬁcantly larger for the production of intermediates at roughly 50%. Besides, the gap
is more pronounced for goods compared to services.
13The most productive countries in the sample (from top down) are: Sweden, Canada, the US, the UK,
Germany and Denmark. The least productive are (from botom up) Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Latvia,
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.18 DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
5.3. Counterfactuals
5.3.1. Counterfactual calibration
The foremost interest in the development accounting framework proposed in the present
paper is the recognition that (i) the production of ﬁnal and intermediate goods commands
diﬀerent eﬃciency levels across countries, that (ii) goods and services diﬀer in their inten-
sity of intermediate input use as well as in (iii) their prominence as suppliers of interme-
diates. Columns 3-5 of Table (2) present the eﬀect of closing down any of these variations
one at a time by comparing again the resulting eﬃciency levels between the bottom and
top productive countries.
The eﬃciency levels inferred in column 2 result from repeating the original calibration




fs, ∀k. Notice that com-
pared to the benchmark, ignoring eﬃciency diﬀerences across specializations implies that
the eﬃciency gap between poor and rich countries in ﬁnal goods production signiﬁcantly
increases while the one in intermediate goods production only slightly decreases. This
also expands the eﬃciency gap in goods compared to services. Clearly, not allowing for
the possibility that poor countries are particularly ineﬃcient at producing intermediates
overstates the overall eﬃciency gap between poor and rich countries to mimic their pro-
ductivity diﬀerences and exaggerates in particular the gap between goods and services to





fs σg = σs =0 .5 γgg = γss =0 .5, ρg = ρs → 1
AP
fg/AR
fg 0.830 0.520 0.748 0.795
AP
fs/AR
fs 0.855 0.663 1.015 0.866
AP
mg/AR
mg 0.456 0.520 0.410 0.436
AP
ms/AR
ms 0.573 0.663 0.678 0.580
Table 2: Alternative calibrations, average eﬃciency levels of poorest to richest quintile
The results in column 4 stem from repeating the calibration exercise but setting σg =
σs =0 .5s ot h a tg o o d sa n ds e r v i c e sh a v et h ei n t e n s i t yi nt h ec o m p o s i t ei n t e r m e d i a t e
input. Evidently, ignoring diﬀerences in the intermediate input intensity between goods
and services increases the eﬃciency gap between rich and poor countries in the production
of goods, and decreases it in the production of services. Just as argued in the theoreti-
cal section, poor countries are likely to appear less productive in producing goods than
services to a large extent because goods are more intensive input users.
Finally, column 5 presents the results from the calibration that sets γgg = γss =0 .5a n d
ρg = ρs → 1( i . e .t h ec o m p o s i t ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di saC o b b - D o u g l a ss p e c i ﬁ c a t i o n )I nt h i s
way the composite intermediate good in both industries has the same value composition
between goods and services. Compared to the benchmark, the qualitative eﬀect on the
implied cross-country eﬃciency diﬀerences of rendering the supply side of the input-output
matrix symmetric is the same as the one of rendering the demand side more symmetric
(column 4). Quantitatively, however, the eﬀect is much smaller.
5.3.2. Convergence scenarios
The second column of Table (3) presents the results on the aggregate productivity gap
(which here is the GDP per capita gap) between the poorest and richest quintile from
moving all countries in the sample to the US eﬃciency level for each category at a time.
First, notice that according to the model’s measure of aggregate productivity the poorest
quintile countries are about 46% percent less productive than the richest countries, which
is only slightly lower than the gap in the data (40%). Hence, the model’s measure is likely
to be a good gauge for aggregate productivity diﬀerences. Compared to this benchmark,DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS 19
it is obvious that having countries move to the US eﬃciency level in goods raises their
income levels very signiﬁcantly while the eﬀect is more negligible for services. Also, the
eﬀect is negligible for ﬁnal goods, but is very strong for intermediate goods, attaining
about 84%. This is to say that if poor countries were somehow able of grow as eﬃcient
as the US, by far the most prominent impact is predicted to come from boosting the





























Table 3: Scenarios of convergence to US eﬃciency levels
The third column of Table (3) is analogous to the second one for the ﬁnal price ratio
pfs/pfg rather than aggregate productivity. The model’s prediction on the mean ﬁnal price
ratio of the poorest compared to the richest countries comes reasonably close to the one
in the data. In light of the theoretical results on the price ratio, it is interesting to observe
that poor countries are predicted to have a similar ﬁnal price ratio to rich countries if they
were as eﬃcient in producing intermediates as rich countries. It conﬁrms the intuition
that the cross-country ﬁnal price ratio depends as much on eﬃciency diﬀerences across
specializations as on eﬃciency diﬀerences across industries.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper identiﬁes that the main driving factor behind aggregate and sectoral relative
productivity diﬀerences across countries is the eﬃciency of intermediate good production.
The technical structure of the input-output relationship is such that relatively minor in-
eﬃciencies in intermediate good production are magniﬁed strongly. The natural question
to ask is, why exactly are some countries so ineﬃcient at producing these goods? The the-
ory presented by Acemoglu, Antr` as and Helpman (2007) on contractual diﬃculties with
specialized input suppliers may oﬀer an important ingredient. Other theories may center
on the ineﬃcient involvement of government in either the procurement of intermediate
goods or the procurement of infrastructure that is particularly crucial for smooth trade
in intermediate inputs. Yet another theory may focus on low levels of competition for
specialized inputs, especially when countries suﬀer from natural or artiﬁcial barriers to in-
ternational trade. There is interest in directing future research in combining the leverage
eﬀects discussed in this paper with an explicit theory of eﬃciency in intermediate input
production.
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Figure (1)i sb a s e do nt h eW o r l dB a n k ’ sI n t e r n a t i o n a lC o m p a r i s o n sP r o g r a m2 0 0 5
benchmark data. The sample includes 147 countries. Commodity agriculture is sim-
ply Food and non-alcoholic beverages (1101). Commodity Industrial consumption good
includes Alcoholic beverages and tobacco (1102), Clothing and footwear (1103), Hous-
ing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels (1104), Furnishings, household equipment and
household maintenance (1105). Commodity Investment corresponds to Gross capital for-
mation (15). Commodity Services includes Health (1106), Transport (1107), Communica-
tion (1108), Recreation and culture (1109), Education (1110) and Restaurants and hotels
(1111). The constructed series are geometric averages with weights based on expenditure
shares on the subsectors. GDP per capita is taken from the Penn World Tables.
Figure (2) computes relative prices from the EU Klems 1997 benchmark data in the
following way. Notice that both series are ratios between intermediate and ﬁnal goods
prices. The series for intermediate good prices is based on the intermediate input price
deﬂator, PPP IIS for services and the weighted average between the price of energy in-
puts (PPP IIE) and material inputs (PPP IIM) for goods. Each series is a geometric
mean over the all the two-digit subsectors in the dataset, the weights being the supply
shares (IIS and IIE+IIM, respectively) to each subsector. The intermediate input price
is hence simply the mean over the prices that all the sectors in the economy pay for that
particular intermediate input. The series for the ﬁnal price is subsequently computed via
the construction of the aggregate output price, based on the output deﬂator (PPP SO).
The output price for goods is a weighted average over the output prices of the subsectors
composing goods: agriculture, hunting, forestry and ﬁshing (AtB); Consumer manufac-
turing (Mcons), Intermediate manufacturing (Minter), Mining and quarrying (C) and
Electricity, gas and water supply (E); Investment goods, excluding hightech (Minves),
Electrical and optical equipment (30t33) and Construction (F). The composite for the
service output price consists of market services, excluding post and telecommunications
(MSERV), Post and telecommunication (64) and Non-market services (NONMAR). The22 DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
output and intermediate price for goods and services in hand, I compute the ﬁnal good
and ﬁnal service price simply by noting that the output price is the geometric average
between the ﬁnal and intermediate price. The weight of the intermediate price is simply
the value of aggregate intermediate consumption on the good or service (the aggregate
value of IIS and IIE+IIM, respectively) as a share of aggregate output (SO). Finally, note
that aggregate productivity in the data equals the ratio between total LP VADD to total
HOURS.
The data underlying Figures (3)a n d( 4)a r ec o u n t r y - y e a rp a i r sf r o mt h eO E C D2 0 0 5
international input-output data. The years are 1995, 2000 and 2005.14 The sample
includes OECD as well a number of poorer countries.15 Intermediate consumption ratios
are computed by adding the intermediate consumption of all the subsectors and dividing
them by their total output. Similarly, own intermediate shares are computed by adding
each subsector’s intermediate consumption deriving from related subsectors and dividing
by the composite sector’s total intermediate consumption. The Goods and Service sectors
are based on the following subsectors, respectively: 1-30 and 31-48. GDP per capita is
taken from the Penn World Tables. Since these data report GDP per capita levels for each
year as a ratio to the US, country-year pairs are constructed by using US GDP/capita
growth between 1995 and 2005, also taken from the Penn World Tables.
8.1.2. Calibration
All the series are based on 1997 EU Klems dataset. For the construction of ﬁnal and
intermediate good price data, please refer to the above description of the data underlying
Figure (2). Also, note that the deﬁnition of the subsectors composing the goods and the
service industry, respectively, is of course identical to the one used in the construction of
prices. Hours worked are based on the series HOURS. The series lg and ls are constructed
by adding the hours worked in all subsectors deﬁned to as goods and services, respectively.
The series yfg, yfs, ymg and yms are built as follows. Aggregate nominal intermediate
production is the aggregate value (i.e. the addition across subsectors) of IIS for services
and IIE+IIM for goods. These series are then deﬂated by their respective intermediate
good price to arrive at yms and ymg.I t h e n c o n s t r u c t a g g r e g a t e o u t p u t f o r g o o d s a n d
services by adding the relevant series (SO) across the subsectors composing each of the
two industries. From the resulting value I subtract IIS for services and IIE+IIM for goods
to arrive at aggregate nominal consumption. Deﬂating the resulting series by the relevant
ﬁnal good price consequently gives yfs and yfg.




US = 1, so that the price ratios of all the other countries are multiples of the US
price ratio. The physical quantities allow for one normalization, which is yUS
fg =1 .
Luxembourg is excluded from the analysis because of lack of data on intermediate
goods.
8.2. Computations
8.2.1. Solution of the theoretical model





=1− σi,∀j ∈{ f,m},i∈{ s,g}. (20)
14Some countries report for dates other than the three, for instance 1997 instead of 1995.
15Amongst others Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Russia.DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS 23


























































ji ,∀j ∈{ f,m},i∈{ s,g},














































































































These last ﬁve formulations, coupled with the clearing conditions (1), ∀i ∈{ g,s},( 3),
(5), (6)a n d( 9)f u l l yc h a r a c t e r i z et h ee q u i l i b r i u m ,l e a v i n gr o o mf o rt h en o r m a l i z a t i o no f
one price.
8.2.2. Proof of Proposition 1









































































































































































Ag − (1 − σg) dAs
As
(1 − σg)(1− σs)+σg (1 − σs)(1− Γgg)+σs (1 − σg)(1− Γss)
8.2.3. Proof of Proposition 2:
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Diﬀerentiation and replacing
d(pfs/pfg)

























1−σg (1 − Γgg)+ σs








1−σg (1 − Γgg)+ σs









1−σg (1 − Γgg) − σs
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1−σg (1 − Γgg) − σs









1−σg (1 − Γgg) − σs
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(1 − σg)(1− σs)+σs (1 − σg)(1− Γss)+σs (1 − σg)(1− Γgg)
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(1 − σg)(1− σs)+σg (1 − σs)(1− Γgg)+σg (1 − σs)(1− Γss)























(1 − σg) dAs
















Ag − (1 − σg) dAs
As
￿
(1 − σg)(1− σs)+σg (1 − σs)(1− Γgg)+σs (1 − σg)(1− Γss)
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8.2.4. Proof of Proposition 3:
Taking logs of (16), diﬀerentiating and replacing
d(pfs/pfg)
















































1−σg (1 − Γgg)+ σs








1−σg (1 − Γgg)+ σs









1−σg (1 − Γgg) − σs









1−σg (1 − Γgg) − σs



































[(1 − σg)(1− σs)+σg (1 − σs)(1− Γgg)+σs (1 − σg)(1− Γss)]
dAf
Af
+[σg (1 − σs)(1− Ωs)+σs (1 − σg)Ω s + σgσs (2 − Γgg − Γss)] dAm
Am
￿
(1 − σg)(1− σs)
,

















[(1 − σs)(1− Ωs)+σs (1 − Γss)]
dAg
Ag +[ ( 1− σg)Ω s + σg (1 − Γgg)] dAs
As
￿
(1 − σg)(1− σs)
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